PROTOCOL NO. 21
To what I reported to you at the last meeting I shall now add
a detailed explanation of external loans. Of foreign loans I
shall say nothing more, because they have fed us with the national
moneys of the goyim, but for our State there will be no foreigners,
that is, nothing external.
We have taken advantage of the venality of administrators and
the slackness of rulers to get our moneys twice, thrice and more
times over, by lending to the goy governments moneys which were
not at all needed by the States. Could anyone do the like in
regard to us?... Therefore, I shall only deal with the details
of internal loans.
States announce that such a loan is to be concluded and open
subscriptions for their own bills of exchange, that is, for their
interestbearing paper. That they may be within the reach of all
the price is determined at from a hundred to a thousand; and a
discount is made for the earliest subscribers. Next day by artificial
means the price of them goes up, the alleged reason being that
everyone is rushing to buy them. In a few days the treasury safes
are as they say overflowing and there's more money than they can
do with (why then take it?). The subscription, it is alleged,
covers many times over the issue total of the loan; in this lies
the whole stage effect - look you, they say, what confidence is
shown in the government's bills of exchange.
But when the comedy is played out there emerges the fact that
a debit and an exceedingly burdensome debit has been created.
For the payment of interest it becomes necessary to have recourse
to new loans, which do not swallow up but only add to the capital
debt. And when this credit is exhausted it becomes necessary
by new taxes to cover, not the loan, but only the interest on
it. These taxes are a debit employed to cover a debit...
Later comes the time for conversions, but they diminish the payment
of interest without covering the debt, and besides they cannot
be made without the consent of the lenders; on announcing a conversion
a proposal is made to return the money to those who are not willing
to con- vert their paper. If everybody expressed his unwillingness
and demanded his money back, the government would be hooked on
their own flies and would be found insolvent and unable to pay
the proposed sums. By good luck the subjects of the goy governments,
knowing nothing about financial affairs, have always preferred
losses on exchange and diminution of interest to the risk of new
investments of their moneys, and have thereby many a time enabled
these governments to throw off their shoulders a debit of several
millions.
Nowadays, with external loans, these tricks cannot be played
by the goyim for they know that we shall demand all our moneys
back.
In this way an acknowledged bankruptcy will best prove to the
various countries the absence of any means between the interests
of the peoples and those who rule them.
I beg you to concentrate your particular attention upon this
point and upon the following: nowadays all internal loans are
consolidated by so-called flying loans, that is, such as have
terms of payments more or less near. These debts consist of moneys
paid into the savings banks and reserve funds. If left for long
at the disposition of a government these funds evaporate in the
payment of interest on foreign loans, and are replaced by the
deposit of equivalent amount of RENTES.
And these last it is which patch up all the leaks in the State
treasuries of the goyim.
When we ascend the throne of the world all these financial and
similar shifts, as being not in accord with our interests, will
be swept away so as not to leave a trace, as also will be destroyed
all money markets, since we will not allow the prestige of our
power to be shaken by fluctuations of prices set upon our values,
which we shall announce by law at the price which represents their
full worth without any possibility of lowering or raising. (Raising
gives the pretext for lowering, which indeed was where we made
a beginning in relation to the values of the goyim.)
We shall replace the money markets by grandiose government credit
institutions, the object of which will be to fix the price of
industrial values in accordance with government views. These
institutions will be in a position to fling upon the market five
hundred millions of industrial paper in one day, or to buy up
for the same amount. In this way all industrial undertakings will
come into dependence upon us. You may imagine for yourselves
what immense power we shall thereby secure for ourselves... .